Right to be forgotten, also known as the right to erasure, is the right of individuals to have their data erased from an entity storing it. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union legally solidified the status of this long held notion. As a consequence, there is a growing need for the development of mechanisms whereby users can verify if service providers comply with their deletion requests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning models, in particular neural networks, have achieved tremendous success in real-world applications and have driven technology companies, such as Google, Amazon, Microsoft, to provide machine learning as a service (MLaaS). Under MLaaS, individual users upload personal datasets to the server, the server then trains a ML model on the aggregate dataset and then provides its predictive functionality as a service to the users. However, recent works have shown * The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
that ML models memorize sensitive information of training data [1] [2] [3] [4] , indicating serious privacy risks to individual user data. At the same time, recently enacted legislation, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union [5] and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United States [6] , recognize the consumers' right to be forgotten, and legally requires companies to remove a user's data from their systems upon the user's deletion request.
However, there is a noticeable lack of concrete mechanisms that enables individual users to verify compliance of their requests. In the MLaaS setting, to satisfy the right to be forgotten, also known as machine unlearning, a naïve mechanism for the server is to retrain the ML models from scratch after removing the data pertaining to users who have requested deletion. This naïve method becomes tedious when the dataset is too large or the model architecture is complex to learn. Thus, the research community has recently proposed several approaches for increasing unlearning efficiency at the server side either by reorganizing training data for efficient deletion [7] [8] [9] or directly updating the model parameters to remove the impact of the deleted data [10, 11] . We note that these works focus on the scenario of an honest server who deletes the user data, and do not provide any support for a mechanism to verify machine unlearning.
In this work, we take the first step towards solving this open problem of verified machine unlearning by individual users in the MLaaS setting. First, we formulate the unlearning verification problem as a hypothesis testing problem [12] (whether the server follows requests to delete users' data or not) and describe the metric used to evaluate a given verification strategy. Note that for a verifiable unlearning strategy to be effective, it needs to satisfy two important objectives. On one hand, the mechanism should enable each user to leave a unique trace in the ML model after being trained on user data, which can be leveraged in the verification phase. On the other hand, such a unique trace needs to have negligible impact on the model's normal predictive behavior. We propose a novel use of backdoor attacks in ML as our mechanism for probabilistically verifying machine unlearning and demonstrate how it meets the above two requirements.
In the classical backdoor attacks [13, 14] , the users (adversaries in these settings) manipulate part of training data such that the final trained ML model (1) returns a particular target label as the classification on inputs that contain a backdoor trigger (e.g., fixed pattern of pixel values at certain positions in the image) and (2) provides normal prediction in the absence of the trigger. In our machine unlearning verification mechanism, we extend a backdoor proposed by Gu et al. [13] . In our approach, each user first randomly chooses its backdoor trigger and the associated target label, then adds the trigger to a fraction of training samples (poisoning) and sets their labels as the target label, and finally provides the poisoned dataset to the MLaaS server. We demonstrate that the ML model trained on such data has a high backdoor success rate (i.e., target label classification in the presence of the trigger) for every user's backdoor trigger and target label pair. When the user later asks the MLaaS provider to delete its data, it can verify whether the provider deleted its data from the ML model by checking the backdoor success rate using its own backdoor trigger with the target label. If the model has a low backdoor success rate, the user can infer that the server followed the deletion request; otherwise, the server did not follow the deletion request.
Furthermore, we theoretically quantify the performance of our backdoor-based verification mechanism under the proposed formulation of hypothesis testing [12] . We experimentally evaluate our proposed techniques over 4 popular datasets -EMNIST, FEMNIST, CIFAR10, and AGNews and 4 different neural network architectures -multi-layer perception (MLP), convolution neural network (CNN), residual network (ResNet), long short-term memory (LSTM). We show that our mechanism has excellent performance -using 30% poisoned samples and merely 20 test queries achieves both false positive and false negative value below 10 −5 . We also evaluate the mechanism under an adaptive malicious server, one which uses the state-of-the-art backdoor defense techniques to decrease the backdoor attack accuracy. We find that such a server can lower the backdoor success rate, especially for a low poisoning ratio, but the backdoor success rates are still significant enough to validate unlearning with high confidence. Our contributions can be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Machine Unlearning Verification Formulation: We provide a rigorous framework for compliance verification of right to be forgotten requests by individual users, in the context of machine learning systems. We formalize this as a hypothesis test between an honest server following the deletion request and a malicious server arbitrarily deviating from the prescribed deletion. Our metric, the power of the hypothesis test, quantifies the confidence a user has in knowing that the service provider complied with its data deletion request. Our framework is applicable to a wide range of MLaaS systems. (2) Proposed Unlearning Verification Mechanism: We propose a backdoor-based mechanism for probabilistically verifying unlearning and show its effectiveness in the above framework. We provide a thorough mathematical analysis of our proposed mechanism. Theorem 1, informally stated, enables a user to find out the number of test samples required to achieve high confidence in verifying its deletion request. We also provide methods for individ-ual users to estimate parameters and necessary statistics for high confidence detection of non-compliance. (3) Extensive Evaluation: Finally, we perform a thorough empirical evaluation of our proposed mechanism. We consider 4 different datasets -EMNIST, FEMNIST, CI-FAR10, AG News -3 image datasets and 1 text dataset. We also study the mechanism over 4 different model architectures -MLP, CNN, ResNet, and LSTM. We quantitatively measure the high confidence of our backdoorbased verification mechanism, and show that it remains effective for an adaptive malicious server who uses stateof-the-art backdoor defense to mitigate backdoor attacks. We also study the heterogeneity in performance across different users, show how the verification confidence in worst-case scenarios can be improved through collaboration among users, and provide bounds on the numbers of users sustainable by our approach.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Deep Neural Networks
Neural networks are a class of algorithms that enable automatic learning of certain tasks through sample data performing the task successfully. These algorithms derive their name as they try to mimic the workings of biological neural networks such as the human brain. With increased computational power, modern neural networks operate on large amounts of data and with millions of configurable parameters. Due to the immense complexity of the non-convex parameter space, the learning of parameters is not optimized globally, but in an iterative fashion trained with data split in mini-batches using the stochastic gradient descent algorithm and its variants [15, 16] . Over the years, various network architectures have been proposed that have shown promise in different target applicationsmultilayer perceptrons [17] , convolutional networks [18] , and residual networks [19] that have achieved tremendous success in computer vision, long short-term memory (LSTM) architectures [20] for applications in natural language processing.
B. Backdoor Attacks and Defenses
In a backdoor attack, the adversary maliciously augments training samples with a hidden trigger into the training process of the target deep learning model such that when the backdoor trigger is added to any test input, the model will output a specific target label. Compared to data poisoning attacks which cause intentional misclassifications on clean test samples via training set manipulations, backdoor attacks only alter the model's predictions in presence of the backdoor trigger and behave normally on clean samples.
In our work, we build upon the attack of Gu et al. [13] . For a subset of the training samples, their attack chooses a backdoor pattern (fixed pixels and their color/brightness), applies this pattern to the samples, and changes the labels to the target backdoor label. During the training process with the full dataset, the target model finally learns to associate the backdoor trigger with the target label. Recent works have improved this approach [14, 21] , extended it to transfer learning [22] , and avoided alteration of the original labels of poison samples [23, 24] . We note that the search for even better backdoor attacks is orthogonal to the goals of our paper.
In parallel, defence mechanisms against backdoor attacks have been explored as well. Wang et al. [25] introduced Neural Cleanse, a backdoor detection and mitigation mechanism that we use in our work. For each possible label, the approach searches for candidate backdoor trigger patterns using optimization procedures. If at least one of the reverseengineered patterns is small enough, Neural Cleanse concludes that the model suffers from a backdoor. Then, three mitigation techniques are applied. First, Neural Cleanse filters out test samples with similar neuron activation patterns as the reversed trigger. Second, Neural Cleanse prunes the neurons which have significant activations only on samples with reversed trigger. However, these two methods suffer from adaptive attacks [26] . In the third approach, Neural Cleanse adds the reversed trigger to some known clean training samples and then fine-tunes the model with those samples along with correct labels. Other recent works on mitigating backdoor attacks analyze neuron activation patterns [27] [28] [29] , remove training samples based on computed outlier scores [30] , and reconstruct the backdoor [29] . However, strategic backdoor attacks with adaptive considerations of these defences can significantly mitigate their performance [26, 27, 31] .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formalize a framework to study machine unlearning in the context of MLaaS. Specifically, we consider the following scenario illustrated in Figure 1a : Users interact with a server who provides machine learning as a service. Users who request the removal of their data from the training set of a machine learning service have no guarantee currently that their data was actually removed. Thus, there is an important need to uncover a strategy that can verify if user data was used in the generation of a machine learning model 1 .
We formalize a framework to study the effectiveness of such machine unlearning verification strategies. a) Notation: Let U denote the set of all users and u ∈ U denote a particular user. Let s ∈ S denote a specific strategy used by the users to verify whether the server deletes its data following the deletion request 2 where S denotes the space of all possible users strategies. Furthermore, let A ∈ A denote the model training algorithm used by the server where A denotes the set of all possible algorithms that can be used by the server. For generality, we consider that such a service allows for multiple requests. We assume that the users use MLaaS while injecting a few test service requests (denoted by n) which will be used to detect server malintent. We then formulate the effectiveness of such machine unlearning verification strategies using hypothesis testing. b) Hypothesis Testing: We define the null hypothesis H 0 to be the state when server deletes the user data and the alternative hypothesis H 1 to be the state when the server does not delete the data. We define the Type I errors as α (false positive) and Type II errors as β (false negative) given below:
We define the effectiveness of a verification strategy s for a given server algorithm A for a given acceptable tolerance of Type I error (α) to be the power of the hypothesis test formulated above, i.e.,
Informally speaking, ρ quantifies the confidence the user has that the server has deleted their data. This deletion confidence (1 − β), the power of the hypothesis test, is the probability that we detect the alternative hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true. On the other hand, α refers to the acceptable value of the server being falsely accused of malicious activity when in practice it follows the data deletion honestly. For a given value of n, α and β cannot be simultaneously reduced and hence we usually set an acceptable value of α and then (1 − β) quantifies the effectiveness of the test.
IV. OUR FRAMEWORK
Verified machine unlearning is in general very hard given that the data has already been outsourced to another party. Specific to the context of machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS), how does one verify if the model is trained on a particular user's data or not? One possible approach is enabled by membership inference attacks such as Shokri et al. [2] or the approach by Song and Shmatikov [32] . However, this line of work suffers from a number of limitations -low accuracy due to the training data not being actively perturbed, extensive knowledge of the MLaaS model's architecture for white-box attack variants, access to auxiliary or shadow data and computational power in an extent similar to the MLaaS provider -all of which limit the feasibility of such approaches for our problem setting.
Threat Model and Assumptions: We aim to distinguish the scenario of an honest server who follows the data unlearning protocol from that of a dishonest server who can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. In particular, we consider two specific models for the server in the latter case -both do not delete the data, but the first is non-adaptive and expects to not get detected, while the second is adaptive and employs stateof-the-art defense mechanisms to mitigate user strategies and to evade detection. We run our evaluation on both, adaptive and non-adaptive, server algorithms. Our approach requires only black-box prediction access to the MLaaS provider's model. However, the provider is not able to determine which user is querying the trained machine learning model. This can be achieved using of-the-shelf anonymous communication (a) The first step involves the backdoor injection during model training.
(b) When the server deletes the user's data (H0), the predictions of backdoor samples are correct labels with high probability.
(c) When the server does not delete the user's data (H1), the predictions of backdoor samples are target labels with high probability. schemes like [33, 34] . Finally, we note that the scope of our approach is limited to validating if users' data was deleted from a specific machine learning model exposed by the MLaaS provider, and does not include validating deletion from other computing or storage resources at the provider.
Our Approach: In order to enable such a system for verifying machine unlearning, we propose an approach that leverages the users' ability to inject stealthy backdoors into their data. In particular, each user modifies their data locally using a private backdoor that is only known to them. If the MLaaS provider trains the model on such data, the backdoor can help the user detect maliciously dismissed data deletion requests as the models trained on the poisoned data (the data which contains such private backdoors) provide different predictions on very specific samples compared to models trained on data without poisoning. Compared to prior work on backdoors (cf. Section II), we propose and analyze a multi-user scenario where each user is employing an individual backdoor. For such a system to work well, it is imperative that there exists a statistically significant distinguishing test between models trained with vs without the backdoored user's data. At the same time, the backdoored data should have minimal impact on the model's normal performance. Figure 1 shows our approach and can be described in two phases as follows: Phase I (1) The users generate individual backdoor patterns that alter the predictions of samples to a fixed label. (2) Users apply their backdoor patterns to a fraction of their data, submit that to the MLaaS provider, and the provider trains a ML model on the data. (3) Each user can run confirmation tests to collect statistics on their backdoor. Phase II (1) Some users request a deletion of their data. The server then either retrains the model complying with these requests or proceeds maliciously. (2) The users query model with n backdoored samples and based on the predictions try to infer if the server complied with their request or not.
In our evaluation (Section VI), we apply a backdoor using the method described in Section II-B, i.e, setting 4 userspecific pixel or words to a dataset dependent value and changing the label to a user-specific target label. Note that the success of altering the prediction using backdoored samples is usually not guaranteed every single time but in a probabilistic manner. Thus, the decision on whether the data has been deleted or not is determined by a hypothesis test. For an effective backdoor algorithm, when the model was trained on backdoored data, the probability of receiving the target label in presence of the backdoor pattern, i.e., backdoor success rate, should be high. At the same time, when the provider has deleted the user's data (the model has not been trained on the user's backdoored samples), the backdoor success rate should be low. In this way the hypothesis test can distinguish between the two scenarios. Throughout this paper, the two probabilities corresponding to backdoor attack accuracy for deleted data and undeleted data are referred to as q (lower), and p (higher) respectively. Furthermore, the confidence of this test increases with n, the number of backdoored test samples a user queries the trained ML model with. Thus our verification mechanism can be used to detect missing deletion with high confidence by increasing the number of test samples.
Given that estimation of p and q is central to the detection of non-compliance, we describe the approach from an individual user perspective below.
Estimating p: A user can obtain an estimatep by querying the model with backdoored samples, immediately after the model has been trained with its data. At this moment, a user can determine whether the backdoor strategy is working. If the resultingp is close to the random prediction baseline, either the applied backdoor strategy s is not working, or its data has not been used in training. However, ifp is significantly higher than the baseline, our strategy s can work well and we can usep as an estimate.
Estimating q: There are two ways of obtaining an estimatê q: If the algorithm can be queried before the user provides its data,q can be obtained by querying the algorithm using samples with the user's backdoor the algorithm has not seen before. If this is not possible, the user can estimateq by applying another random backdoor pattern to its data and querying the algorithm. The output should be similar to the case where the algorithm has never seen the user's legitimate backdoor pattern.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we theoretically analyze the confidence of our hypothesis test. The confidence, expressed by the metric ρ A,α (s, n), is based on a hypothesis test where two cases are compared: H 0 -the data has been deleted, and H 1 -the data has not been deleted. We measure the Type II error β which denotes the probability that the server evades detection, i.e., the server behaves malicious but is not caught. Note that this requires we set a level of acceptable Type I error α, i.e., the probability that we falsely accuse the server of avoiding deletion. Hence, the metric ρ A,α (s, n) = 1 − β is a function of the backdoor strategy s and the number of predictions on backdoored test samples n for a given MLaaS server A and a value of Type I error α. We structure the section as follows: (A) Basic Hypothesis Testing: First we set-up the basics of hypothesis testing for our scenario and introduce the required notation. (B) Estimating Deletion Confidence: Next, we show how to compute the metric ρ A,α (s, n) for a given Type I error α. This can be reduced to the following steps:
• Compute the optimal value of the threshold t for a given value of α, the Type I error • Compute the value of β, the Type II error, for the given optimal threshold t • Compute ρ A,α (s, n) from the previously computed β (C) Relaxing Assumptions: Our theoretical analysis is based on prior knowledge of statistics defining the hypotheses H 0 and H 1 . Next, we outline strategies for users to estimate these statistics, and theoretically quantify the impact of the estimation on our system.
A. Basic Hypothesis Testing
We query the ML-mechanism A with n backdoored samples {sample i } n i=1 of a single user and measure how often the MLmechanism does classify the samples as the desired target label, denoted as Target i . Then, the measured success rate iŝ
Furthermore, we define two important quantities, q, p that quantify the probability that the prediction on backdoored samples is equal to the target label for the null hypothesis vs the alternative hypothesis.
Note that the measurer approaches q if the null hypothesis H 0 (data was deleted) is true and approaches p if the alternative hypothesis H 1 (data was not deleted) is true. To decide whether we are in H 0 or H 1 , we define a threshold t and ifr ≤ t we output H 0 else output H 1 . The false-positive error α and false-negative error β are the respective leftover probability masses that we have decided wrongly. This is illustrated in Figure 2a . The threshold t is set according to the desired properties of the hypothesis test. As common in statistics, t is set based on a small value of α (also known as p-value), the probability that we falsely accuse the ML-provider of dismissal of our data deletion request.
B. Estimating Deletion Confidence
To derive an analytic expression for ρ A,α (s, n), we note that the order in which we request the prediction of backdoored samples does not matter. Moreover, we assume that the ML provider returns the correct target prediction label with probability q for users with fulfilled deletion requests, and p otherwise. Further, we assume that the ML provider is not aware which user is querying. Else, the provider could run user specific evasion strategies, e.g., having for each user a unique model with only the user's data excluded. This can, for example, be achieved by an anonymous communication channel. Since the user strategy is completely defined by the the two parameters q, p, we will often interchangeably express a strategy s for these cases by s = (q, p).
First, we show that the occurrence probability of a usermeasured average backdoor success ratior follows a binomial distribution with abscissa rescaled to [0,1] with mean q (deleted), or p (not deleted) respectively. Then, we compute the Type II error β based on the Type I error α that results from the overlap of these two binomial distributions. Finally, we derive an analytic expression for the verification confidence:
Theorem 1. For a given ML-mechanism A and a given acceptable Type I error probability α, the deletion confidence ρ A,α (s, n) is given by the following expression:
where p, q are as given by Equation (4) and H(·) is the heavyside step function, i.e., H(x) = 1 if x is True and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 1 gives a closed-form expression to compute the backdoor success probability as a function of the various system parameters. To prove the above result, we rely on the independence of prediction order assumption. We define a test of the backdoor success of n consecutive samples as follows:
Definition 1. Given oracle access to the predictions on n samples {sample i } n i=1 , for r ∈ [0, 1], we define Test n,r as a random variable that returns a value in {0, 1} n where each entry is 1 with probability r and 0 with probability 1 − r assuming the order of the predictions is immaterial and that they are processed independently. If r is set to the backdoor success probability p or q, then the above defined Test n,r mimics the output of the corresponding ML-mechanism as it effectively measures the ratio of cases where a backdoor was able to change the prediction of its sample to a target label. Hence, for the hypothesis test, it is sufficient to compare the backdoor success ratio p where the backdoor works (data not deleted) to the case where it does not work (data deleted) with ratio q. Next, we prove that the random variabler follows a rescaled binomial distribution.
Lemma 1 (Measured backdoor success rate). Let n ∈ N. Let o ∈ {0, 1} n be a random draw from Test n,r with r ∈ [0, 1], the following statements hold:
(1) The random variabler = 1 n n j=1 o j follows a binomial distribution with abscissa scaled to [0, 1] with draws n and success probability r where o j is the j th draw output of o. We callr the discrete success rate probability.
(2) The standard-deviation ofr shrinks as O( 1 √ n ) (3) The tail probability mass ofr can be computed for
x ∈ [0, 1] using the following relation (and a symmetric relation forr ≤ x):
Proof. As we assumed the independence of prediction order, the output of Test n,r follows a binomial distribution binom (n, r) where n is the number of draws and r is the success probability.
(1) For k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let C k be the set of all possible outputs c of Test n,r with n j=0 c j = k. Note that all outputs are equally likely. Then, the occurrence probability for r = k n is given by:
(2) The variance of a binomial distribution is σ 2 n = nr(1 − r). With scaled abscissa by 1/n, the standard deviation becomes σ = σ 2 n /n 2 = r(1 − r)/ √ n.
(3) The mass in the tail is the sum over the probabilities for the corresponding discrete events. Hence Equation (6) directly follows from summing Equation (7) for k ≥ n · x
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 1 can be directly applied to prove the results in Theorem 1. In particular, the hypothesis test consists of distinguishing two scaled binomial distributions with r = q in case H 0 (the data has been deleted) and r = p for H 1 (data has not been deleted). Figure 2a graphically illustrates this while Figure 2b demonstrates the effect of multiple samples on the scaled distributions. As seen in Lemma 1, the scaled distributions concentrate around the mean, thus reducing the probability in the overlapped areas, which in effect reduces the Type I and Type II error probabilities. By Lemma 1, the shape of the hypothesis distriubtions depens on q for H 0 and p for H 1 . Therefore, for a given a threshold t ∈ [0, 1], the Type I error α t and the Type II error β t for the hypothesis test depend on p and q respectively.
Given that α is set by systemic constraints, we invert Equation (8a) to get the optimal value of the threshold t and then plug that into Equation (8b). Consider the following equality defining t α given α:
We can then use this implicit definition of threshold t α to determine the Type II error β given a value of p:
Finally, to connect this value with ρ A,α (s, n), we use Equation (2) from Section III and s = (p, q):
which gives us an analytic expression for the confidence that we are in case H 1 , i.e. that our data has not been deleted as requested. If this value is high, the user has high confidence that the server does not follow deletion request.
C. Relaxing Assumptions: Single User Perspective
In our theoretical analysis above, we have assumed to know p and q perfectly. In a real-world setup, these values are always measurements. While a machine learning service provider has the ability to quantify p and q accurately on a lot of samples, single users that want to verify the deletion of their data do usually not have this kind of opportunity. They need to work with vague estimatesp andq obtained on a low number of samples n as described in Section IV.
We observe that if we overestimateq with a boundq and underestimatep with a boundp , then the metric ρ A,α (s, n) provides a lower bound, i.e., the confidence guarantees given by ρ do not worsen if the distance betweenq andp increases.
withq ≤q andp ≥p . This comes from the fact that for a given α the overlap of the two scaled binomial distribution decreases when they are moved further apart, and thereby decreasing the β which in terms defines ρ. Alternatively, users can assume priors for p and q, apply Bayes' theorem, and compute ρ A,α as the expectation over all possible p and q: 
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe our experimental setup, then present the performance of our verification framework for both non-adaptive server and adaptive server. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/inspire-group/ unlearning-verification.
A. Experimental setup
Pipeline for machine unlearning verification. The first part of our evaluation examines the distinguishability of backdoor success rates for data owner whose data has been deleted by a benevolent MLaaS provider versus the case where the provider has maliciously avoided deletion. First, for each user of the datasets described below, a fraction of its training samples are equipped with a user specific and dataset dependent backdoor, i.e., 4 random pixels or words are overwritten and their labels are set to a user specific target label. After training the model with the partially backdoored dataset, we compute the backdoor success rate for each user's backdoor trigger with its target label, formerly denoted by p in Equation (4). Then, we compute the same success probability on a part of the users that have been excluded before training, introduced as q in Equation (4). Finally, we illustrate the decreasing average Type-II error β (cf. Equation (1)) for a range of number of measurements n for different values of Type-I error α, leading to an increasing average deletion confidence ρ A,α (s, n).
As MLaaS providers can defend against backdoor attacks, we illustrate the success of our approach in a comparison of a non-adaptive MLaaS provider that does not implement adaptive defences to an adaptive provider that implements state-of-the-art defence Neural Cleanse [25] (cf. Section II-B). Moreover, we evaluate the performance for different models with varying complexity.
Optimally, such an evaluation excludes each user individually from the full dataset and then retrains the model for each exclusion again from scratch. Due to computation power restrictions, we separated 20% of the available users before training, and trained the models on the leftover 80% of the users. Note that our approach is applicable and effective even when a small number of users request data deletion. We exclude 20% of users to obtain a reliable estimation of the performance of our verification mechanism. Therefore, the first 20% of users were not included in any training and act in the evaluation as users that have requested the deletion of their data (H 0 ). We call them "deleted users". In contrast, we have split remaining users' data into a training and a test set (80% samples are in training set, and remaining 20% samples are in test set). We trained the model on the training set. The test set was used to evaluate the case where the users' data was not deleted (H 1 ). Accordingly, we call them "undeleted users".
Following paragraphs describe evaluated datasets, ML architectures and backdoor methods, summarized in Table I . Extended MNIST (EMNIST). The dataset is composed of handwritten character digits derived from the NIST Special Database 19 [35] . The input images are in black-and-white with a size of 28 × 28 pixels. In our experiments, we use the TABLE II: Summary of our backdoor-based verification performance for both non-adaptive and adaptive servers, where p is the backdoor success rate of undeleted users, and q is the backdoor success rate of deleted users. We provide the Type-II error (β) of our verification mechanism with 20 test samples and α as 10 −5 . We find that the adaptive server with Neural Cleanse can greatly reduce the backdoor success of the MLP model trained on EMNIST dataset, leading to β = 0.93. However, when using CNN architecture to train a EMNIST classifier, the defense of Neural Cleanse is limited, and we reduce β to 6.6×10 −12 . Not Applicable digits form of EMNIST, which has 10 class labels, each with 280,000 samples [36] . We split the dataset into 1,000 users in an independent and identically distributed (IID) manner, with 280 samples per user. For the model architecture, we use a multi-layer perceptron (MLP), which contains three layers with 512, 512, and 10 neurons. Using the Adam optimizer [16] , we train the model with 20 epochs and a batch size of 128. On a clean dataset, the model achieves 99.84% training accuracy and 98.99% test accuracy. For the backdoor method, each user chooses a random target label and a backdoor trigger by randomly selecting 4 pixels and setting their values as 1.
Federated Extended MNIST (FEMNIST). The dataset augments Extended MNIST by providing a writer ID [37] . We also use the digits, containing 10 class labels and 382,705 samples from 3,383 users, rendering it IID due to the unique writing style of each person. Same as EMNIST, the input image is in black-and-white with 28 × 28 pixels. Different from EMNIST, this dataset does not include additional preprocessing, such as size-normalization and centering. Also, the pixel value is inverse: the value of 1.0 corresponds to the background, and 0.0 corresponds to the digits. Therefore, we use the same backdoor method as for EMNIST, but setting the pixels to 0 instead of 1. For the model architecture, we use a convolutional neural network (CNN), containing two convolutional layers with 3×3 kernel size and filter numbers of 32 and 64, followed by two fully connected layers, containing 512 and 10 neurons. We use the Adam optimizer [16] to train the model with 20 epochs and batch size of 128. Without backdooring, the model achieves 99.72% training accuracy and 99.45% test accuracy. CIFAR10. Providing 32 × 32 × 3 color images in 10 classes, with 6,000 samples per class, we split this dataset in into 500 users in an IID manner, 120 samples per user. Applying a residual network (ResNet) [19] , containing 3 groups of residual layers with number of filters set to (16, 32, 64) , and 3 residual units for each group, and using Adam [16] for training with with 200 epochs and batch size of 32, this model achieves 98.98% training accuracy and 91.03% test accuracy on a clean dataset without backdoors. To achieve good accuracy performance, we use standard data augmentation methods (e.g., shift, flip). The backdoor method is identical to EMNIST. Note that we consider RGB channels as different pixels. AG News. This is a major benchmark dataset for text classification [38] . The raw dataset [39] contains 1, 281, 104 news articles from more than 2, 000 news sources (users). Similar to Zhang et al. [38] , we choose the 4 largest news categories (Business, Sci/Tech, Sports, World) as class labels and use the title and description fields of the news to predict its category. We filter out samples with less than 15 words and only keep users with more than 30 samples to improve statistical evaluation reliability. The final dataset has 549, 714 samples from 580 users. For the model architecture, we use a long short-term memory (LSTM) network [20] . The model first turn words into 100-dimension vectors, and then uses a LSTM layer with 100 units to learn feature representations, and finally a linear layer with 4 neurons for classification. We use the Adam optimizer [16] to train the model with 5 epochs and batch size of 64. Without backdooring, the model achieves 96.87% training accuracy and 91.03% test accuracy. For the backdoor method, each user chooses a random target label and a backdoor pattern by randomly picking 4 word positions in last 15 words and replacing them with 4 user-specific words, which are randomly chosen from the whole word vocabulary.
B. Results for the non-adaptive server
We first present the evaluation results for the non-adaptive server, where the server uses the non-adaptive learning algo- (h) Verification performance for CIFAR10 classifiers with different poison ratios.
(i) Verification performance for the CIFAR10 classifier with different α.
(j) Model accuracy and backdoor success rate for AG News classifiers.
(k) Verification performance for AG News classifiers with different poison ratios.
(l) Verification performance for the AG News classifier with different α. Fig. 3 : Our backdoor-based machine unlearning verification results with a non-adaptive server on the EMNIST dataset (the first row), the FEMNIST dataset (the second row), the CIFAR10 dataset (the third row), and the AG News dataset (the last row). We present the model accuracy and backdoor success rate in the first column, the verification performance with Type-I error α = 10 −5 in the second column, and the verification performance with a poison ratio of 30% in the third column. rithm to train the ML model. On each dataset, we compute the backdoor success rate for each individual, and compute the undeleted users' average success rate p and deleted users' average success rate as q to evaluate the performance of our machine unlearning verification method with different numbers n of test queries, following Theorem 1.
First, our verification mechanism works well with high confidence on the EMNIST dataset. From Figure 3a , we can see that the attack accuracy for undeleted users (p) increases with the poison ratio, while the attack accuracy for deleted users (q) stays around 10% (random guess accuracy). At the same time, poison ratios as high as 60% have negligible impact on model accuracy for clean test samples. Besides plotting the average accuracy across users, we also show the 25%-75% quantile ranges for individual users' accuracy values 3 , examined in more detail in Section VII. Figure 3b shows that a higher poison ratio also leads to a lower Type-II error in our verification mechanism due to a larger gap between p and q, therefore increasing the confidence in distinguishing between H 0 and H 1 . We further show the verification performance with different tolerances on the Type-I error (α) in Figure 3c by fixing the poison ratio at 30%.
Given a Type I error α and a fixed number of test samples n, (a) Model accuracy and backdoor success rate for EMNIST classifiers.
(b) Verification performance for EMNIST classifiers with different poison ratios.
(c) Verification performance for the EMNIST classifier with different α.
(d) Model accuracy and backdoor success rate for FEMNIST classifiers.
(e) Verification performance for FEMNIST classifiers with different poison ratios.
(f) Verification performance for the FEM-NIST classifier with different α.
(g) Model accuracy and backdoor success rate for CIFAR10 classifiers 3 .
(h) Verification performance for CIFAR10 classifiers with different poison ratios.
(i) Verification performance for the CIFAR10 classifier with different α. Fig. 4 : Our backdoor-based machine unlearning verification results with an adaptive server on the EMNIST dataset (the first row), the FEMNIST dataset (the second row), and the CIFAR10 dataset (the third row).We present the model accuracy and backdoor success rate in the first column, the verification performance with Type-I error α = 10 −5 in the second column, and the verification performance with a poison ratio of 30% in the third column.
the computation of the corresponding type II error β is discrete as the corresponding rescaled binomial distribution is discrete and therefore the probability mass in the tails usually does not sum up exactly to α (cf. Section V). This property leads to jumps when plotting β over different n as the probability mass of a discrete event might not be included in the tail with maximal size α anymore, and be added to β instead. This is the case for all plots, not only for Figure 3b and Figure 3c . Second, our verification mechanism generalizes to more complex image datasets. Figure 3d to Figure 3f and Figure 3g to Figure 3i present the accuracy performance and the verification performance for the non-IID FEMNIST dataset and the CIFAR10 dataset, respectively. Similar to EMNIST, the gap between p and q becomes larger when increasing the poison ratio. The only exception is that the CIFAR10 classifier has a much lower p value with 90% poison ratio along with a low accuracy on the clean samples. Furthermore, our verification mechanism achieves more confidence on those two datatsets than the EMNIST dataset.
Third, our verification mechanism is also applicable to non-image datasets, illustrated for the AG News dataset from Figure 3j to Figure 3l . The undeleted users' backdoor attack accuracy is around 100% with a poison ratio greater than 10%, while the deleted users' backdoor attack accuracy stays around 25% (random guess accuracy). Specifically, for the AG News classifier with a 30% poison ratio and 20 test samples, we achieve β = 6.6 × 10 −16 with α = 10 −5 .
C. Results for the adaptive server
We choose the state-of-the-art backdoor defense method, Neural Cleanse [25] , for the adaptive server. Proposed by Wang et al. [25] , Neural Cleanse first reverse engineers the backdoor triggers by searching for minimum input perturbation needed for a target label classification, then uses the reverse engineered backdoor trigger to poison certain samples with correct labels to retrain the model for one step. We extend this defense method to our setup where different users inject different backdoors into the model. Specifically, the adaptive server runs the Neural Cleanse defense method for individual user's data with the aim to make the backdoor injection unsuccessful. We provide results only for the three image datasets as Neural Cleanse needs gradient information with regard to input samples for reverse engineering the backdoor which is not available for the discrete AG News inputs.
First, the Neural Cleanse method greatly reduces the backdoor attack success rate on the EMNIST MLP clas-sifiers. As shown in Figure 4a , the undeleted users' backdoor attack accuracy (p) is smaller than 40% when the poison ratio is below 60%. Although greatly reduced after applying the defense method, p is still significantly higher than q (deleted users' attack accuracy), especially with a high poison ratio. Thus our verification can still have high confidence performance with enough test samples. As shown later in Section VI-D, when switching the model architecture to CNN, the performance of Neural Cleanse is much worse and our verification mechanism with the adaptive server succeeds.
Second, the Neural Cleanse method has limited defense performance on more complex image datasets with more complex model architectures. We show the accuracy performance and verification performance for FEMNIST CNN and CIFAR10 ResNet classifiers from Figure 4d to Figure 4i . On the FEMNIST dataset, we still have undeleted users' attack accuracy above 90% when the poison ratio is greater than 30%, where our verification mechanism achieves high confidence.
On the CIFAR10 dataset, we still have p value above 77% for poison ratio between 30% and 50% with a decrease of clean test accuracy smaller than 5%.
D. Performance with model complexity
We notice that the MLP model on the EMNIST dataset has limited backdoor success in the presence of Neural Cleanse [25] , thus preventing our verification method to achieve as high confidence as other image datasets. To explore the impact of model complexity, we train a CNN classifier with the same architecure as for FMNIST on the EMNIST dataset as well. We first show the influence on the backdoor attacks in Figure 5a , where we plot the backdoor success rate for undeleted users with and without the backdoor defense. We can clearly see that using the CNN with a larger model (a) Backdoor attack accuracy for undeleted users.
(b) Verification performance for EMNIST classifiers. We fix the poison ratio as 30% and α as 10 −5 . complexity leads to higher backdoor success rate for undeleted users (p), especially when the server uses Neural Cleanse [25] for backdoor defense. The backdoor success for deleted users stays around 0.1, and thus the CNN-based EMNIST classifiers also have much better verification performance compared to the MLP classifiers, as presented in Figure 5b .
VII. EVALUATING HETEROGENEITY ACROSS INDIVIDUAL USERS
So far, our analysis on deletion verification performance is evaluated based on the "average" backdoor attack accuracy p across all undeleted users and the average backdoor attack accuracy across all deleted users q. Next, we evaluate the heterogeneity in the performance of stochastic deletion verification across individual users, to account for the variance in individual users' backdoor attack accuracy values. We find that while most users are able to conclude correctly whether their data has been deleted, a small subset of deleted users also have high backdoor attack accuracy although the ML model never trained on their backdoor triggers and target labels.
To quantify this effect, we present the cumulative distribution plots for non-adaptive server over different datasets in Figure 6 , where we fix the poison ratio as 30%. Similar results for the adaptive server are shown in the Appendix A.
We can see that except on the EMNIST classifier with Neural Cleanse, almost all undeleted users have high backdoor attack accuracy close to 100%. However, several deleted users indeed have high backdoor attack accuracy for the image classifiers. For example, for the CIFAR10 classifier with nonadaptive server, 5 out of 100 deleted users have backdoor attack accuracy higher than 80%. We think the reason is that there are one or more undeleted users with similar backdoor triggers and the same target labels as those rare deleted users, resulting in their high backdoor attack accuracy without their data being used in the training set of the ML model. In fact, popular image classification architectures, such as CNN and ResNet, are trained to behave similarly for images with rotation, translation, and transformation, leading to behave similarly on similar triggers.
For the AG News dataset, we rarely observe deleted users with high backdoor attack accuracy: only 2 out of 116 deleted users have backdoor attack accuracy slightly higher than 50%, while all except one undeleted users have backdoor attack accuracy higher than 66%. Compared to image datasets, our backdoor triggers (random word list) on the AG News dataset are very different across different users.
For image classifiers, on those deleted users with high backdoor attack accuracy, our verification mechanism is likely to wrongly blame the server for not deleting the data. To resolve this issue, we propose that multiple users cooperate with each other by sharing their estimated backdoor success rates and thereby achieve high confidence verification. Specifically, we decide based on the lowest success rate among all collaborating users, given that the scenario H 1 is incorrectly inferred when multiple deleted user report high backdoor success rate. However, this occurs with low probability. In contrast, for the correct hypothesis H 1 , all undeleted users typically report high backdoor success rates with high probability. We illustrate the effectiveness of this cooperative strategy among users in Table  III , where different columns show the worst-case probability of β ≥ 0.01 with varying numbers of cooperative users. Note that by increasing the number of cooperative users by 1, the worst-case probability falls by one order of magnitude.
To further make our verification mechanism more reliable, we can also use multiple backdoor triggers with multiple target labels for one user and estimate the lowest backdoor success rate among all triggers. As long as the deleted user has one trigger leading to low attack accuracy, we can obtain reliable performance from a worst-case perspective. Another direction is to combine our method with other verification methods, such as user-level membership inference attacks to detect whether a user's data was used to train the ML model or not [32] . We leave this as future work.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Number of Users Sustainable
Given the finite space of backdoor patterns, one or more users can choose similar (similar and not exact because the ML algorithms are robust to small deviations) backdoors which can be a source of inaccuracies. It is important to have bounds on how many users can our mechanism sustain before such collisions start hampering the overall system performance. For ease of exposition, we consider the domain of image classification. Let us consider a setting with binary images of size n, each backdoor has w pixels set, and define dissimilar backdoors to be backdoors that differ in at least d values. For instance, in our backdoor, when using EMNIST dataset, each image is n = 784 = 28 × 28, we have set w = 4 pixels and d = 2 (i.e., if two backdoors share 3 of the 4 pixels, they interfere with each others classification). We want to answer the following question:
How many backdoor patterns exist that are sufficiently dissimilar to each other? This can be answered by an exact mapping to the following problem in coding theory: find the maximal number of binary vectors of length n, hamming distance d apart, with constant weight w. Exactly computing this quantity, denoted by A (n, d, w) , is an open research question but there exist a number of bounds in the literature (Chapter 17 in MacWilliams and Sloane [40] ). In our study, we need to compute the quantity:
where the summation is because backdoors can differ arbitrarily as long as they are sufficiently dissimilar. Theorem 7 from [40] provides exact values for simple cases such as those required in our EMNIST example. We can then use a simple birthday paradox analysis to bound the number of users in the system to ensure low probability of backdoor collision. Note that the above analysis becomes more involved when using Convolutional Neural Networks as the convolution layers treat neighboring pixels with the same filter weight.
B. Usefulness of our mechanism on the server side Besides leveraging the backdoor attacks for deletion verification at the user side, our approach also provides benefits to an honest server. First, the server can use our method to validate that their data deletion pipeline is bug-free. In cases where the MLaaS providers do not want backdoors in their ML models, such backdoor-based verification mechanism can be applied in production by setting the target backdoor labels to a specific "outlier" label, which is not used for future prediction.
Second, the server can use our backdoor-based mechanism to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of recently proposed deletion approaches without strict deletion guarantees, such as [10, 11] . These approaches directly update the model parameters to remove the impact of the deleted data without retraining the model. Our framework can be an efficient way to evaluate their performance.
C. Other backdoor attacks and defenses
The contribution of our paper is to use backdoor attacks for probabilistic verification of machine unlearning. Our verification mechanism can be easily extended to other backdoor attack methods [14, 23, 24] . When testing the verification performance under a strategic malicious server, we use the stateof-the-art backdoor defense method, Neural Cleanse [25] , to train the ML model. We find that Neural Cleanse only has a limited impact of our verification approach: undeleted users still have much higher backdoor success rate than the deleted users, and our verification mechanism still works well. Several new defense approaches have also been proposed recently [29, 31] . Veldanda et al. [31] showed that the defense method proposed by Liu et al. [29] is ineffective against adaptive backdoor attacks, and their proposed defence came out last month. However, unless they fully mitigate backdoor issues in the multi-user setting, our verification method is still useful.
If the malicious adversary finds a perfect defense method to fully mitigate the backdoor attacks, then our verification approach will not work, but a user can become aware of this scenario by observing a low backdoor attack accuracy before the deletion request. In this scenario, the user could either find stealthier backdoor attacks [22, 24] , or use alternative verification methods, such as membership inference attacks [32] .
IX. RELATED WORK
A. Existing Machine Unlearning Approaches
The simple approach of just deleting data as requested by users and retraining the model from scratch is inefficient in case of large datasets and models with high complexities. Therefore, Cao and Yang [7] applied ideas from statistical query learning [41] and train the model based on intermediate summations of training data. Upon deletion request, they update the summations which is significantly more efficient. However, their method is only applicable to conventional machine learning models. Ginart et al. [8] proposed two provably efficient mechanisms for k-means clustering by either quantizing centroids at each iteration or using a divide-andconquer algorithm to recursively partition the training set into subsets. Concurrently, Garg et al. [42] explore the related but orthogonal problem of what it means to delete user data from a theoretical viewpoint.
Bourtoule et al. [9] proposed to split the training set into disjoint shards, train local models separately on every shard, and aggregate outputs from all local models to obtain the final prediction. By splitting data into disjoint shards, only one or few local models need to be retrained for deletion requests.
Other methods aim to update model parameters to remove the impact of the deleted data on the model. Guo et al. [10] defined data deletion as an indistinguishability problem: similar to differential privacy [43] , for a deletion request, the updated model with their approach should be difficult to distinguish from the model retrained from scratch by removing the deleted samples. Specifically, Guo et al. leverage the influence function [44] of the deleted training point to apply a one-step Newton update on model parameters. Baumhauer et al. [11] focused on the setting where the deletion request is to remove an entire class. They design a linear transformation layer appended to the model for class deletion request. However, there is no guarantee that no information of the deleted class is left inside the updated model.
B. Verifying Machine Unlearning
One approach is the use of verifiable computation. Such techniques can enable data-owners to attest the MLaaS provider's processing steps and thus verify that the data is truly being deleted. Possible techniques include the use of secure processors [45] , trusted platform modules [46, 47] , and zeroknowledge proofs [48, 49] . However, such techniques require assumptions that limit their practicality -server side computation, the use of trusted parties, computational overhead along with frequent attacks on the security of such systems [50, 51] . Moreover, as these schemes require detailed insight into the computation process, frequently, the service provider cannot keep the model a secret, which is a serious limitation.
Shokri et al. [2] investigated membership inference attacks in machine learning, where the adversary goal is to guess whether a sample is in the target model's training set. They train shadow models on auxiliary data to mimic the target model and then train a classifier for inference attacks. Song et al. [32] extended the record-level membership inference to user-level membership inference attacks that determines whether a user's data was used to train the target model. To apply these methods to our setup, each user needs to train shadow models on an auxiliary datasets similar to the target model, including knowledge of the target model's architecture and computation capability. In comparison, our backdoor-based machine unlearning verification approach does not require those strong assumptions and obtains extreme good verification performance.
Recently, Sablayrolles et al. [52] proposed a method to detect whether a particular image dataset has been used to train a model by adding well-designed perturbations that alters their extracted features and thereby watermarking the model. Instead of tracing an entire dataset, our approach considers a multi-user setting where each user adds a personal backdoor for future machine unlearning verification. Also, they only consider image datasets. Finally, Adi et al. used backdoor attacks to watermark deep learning models [53] .
X. CONCLUSION
The right to be forgotten addresses an increasingly pressing concern in the digital age. While there are several regulations and interpretations of the legal status of this right, there are few concrete approaches to study data deletion. In this paper, we formally examine probabilistic verification of machine unlearning and provide concrete quantitative measures to study this from an individual user perspective. Based on backdoor attacks, we propose a mechanism by which users can verify, with high confidence, the compliance/incompliance of service providers of their right to be forgotten. We provide extensive evaluation of our proposed verification mechanism over a range of network architectures and datasets. Overall, this work provides a mathematical foundation for a quantitative verification of machine unlearning.
